The course outline for Software Engineering is as follows:

An introduction to software life cycle models; size estimation; cost and schedule estimation; project management; risk management; formal technical reviews; analysis, design, coding and testing methods; configuration management and change control; and software reliability estimation. Emphasis on large development projects.

The course is being taught by Dr. Aldo Dagnino.

The course outline for Computer Networks is as follows:

Detailed description and related performance issues of OSI layers two and three for wide-area networks, well-known standards for local and wide area networks such as Ethernet and TCP/IP, and basic random access mechanisms for local area networks. 3 credit hours.

The course is being taught by Dr. Rudra Dutta. It is a live course and thus offered through a RealMedia format. The digitized lecture is made available approximately thirty minutes after the actual class.

The second semester as an official distance learning student at NC State has begun, and I’ve finally been reimbursed for my first semester by my employer. Grades for the course were as follows:

• Midterm Exam, 96%
• Homework 1, 100%
• Homework 2, 100%
• Homework 3, 100%
• Homework 4, 105%
• Homework 5, 96%
• Final Exam, 99%

Final average: 98.46% (A+)
Costs: $2040 (tuition) + $155.26 (books)

Based on these results, I’ve decided to take two courses in the Fall 2007 semester, CSC 510: Software Engineering, and ECE 570: Computer Networks.

Robert McNamara served as U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968, during the Vietnam War. In his 1996 book, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, McNamara outlined 11 lessons gleaned from this experience:

1. We misjudged then — and we have since — the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries … and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.
2. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience … We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.
3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values.
4. Our judgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.
5. We failed then — and have since — to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine…
6. We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.
7. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement … before we initiated the action.
8. After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course … we did not fully explain what was happening and why we were doing what we did.
9. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Our judgment of what is in another people’s or country’s best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our image or as we choose.
10. We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action … should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.
11. We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions … At times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world.

Poet and philosopher George Santayana told us that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Have we repeated history?